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1 Introduction 
 
 
Today millions of customers of online services are using smartphones. It is very 
common that the primary accessing channel for the service is either purpose built 
mobile application, or a web browser interface optimized for the mobile phone 
use. Also, the online services commonly use the smartphone of the end-user as 
an asset that identifies the individual user. This thesis studies the factors that 
helped the smartphone to become such an asset. The thesis further studies 
where the technical development is heading next and presents important topics 
that may affect the future. 
 
 
1.1 The past 
 
During many decades, the most used access control mechanism on digital 
services has been username and password. The users are identified 
(authenticated) by the username and password pair that they present during 
entering the service. This has been relatively simple and low-cost solution for the 
designers and the owners of the services. 
 
On the other hand, the passwords caused many concerns for the users and the 
service providers. Passwords may be forgotten or stolen. They are also 
sometimes easily guessable. Often users re-use passwords between different 
online services and so data breach on one service usually generates a real threat 
to other services. Despite these problems, more secure and more advanced user 
authentication mechanisms (which existed) were not widely taken into use 
outside military, banking or corporate domain until the last decade.  
 
As mentioned, more secure authentication mechanisms have existed many 
decades. For example, in the corporate use the end-users have been given small 
electronic devices, so called hardware tokens, that they could use when 
accessing the critical systems. At banking sector, some institutions have 
traditionally used transaction authentication numbers in the form of a list of 
number sequences printed on card board. These numbers are used by customers 
during entering the bank online service. 
 
It is an interesting question why the more secure authentication mechanisms 
have not achieved more popularity compared to the password. Lot of research 
has been done about the usability of the authentication methods. Generally 
speaking, it has been discovered that the secure authentication methods might 
have been too expensive for consumers, clumsy to use, or not intuitive. 
 
 
1.2 The present 
 
The total count of mobile subscribers worldwide has been estimated to be around 
5 billion [1]. Over half of them have smartphones [2], so majority of world’s 
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population are potential users for online services that use the smartphone as the 
access channel. Many services use the smartphone as an identification asset for 
these users. However, lack of generic and widely adopted standards has slowed 
down the evolution of the smartphone based user authentication.  
 
Security of the mobile apps and the mobile platforms has been a concern [3]. 
There are many attack scenarios threating the authentication of the users in 
smartphone. The user authentication performed by a smartphone application is 
usually based on secret keys that are stored inside the persistent memory of the 
mobile device. These secret keys can be stolen by malicious software under 
certain circumstances. Also, the data that the mobile applications transfer over 
the network may be monitored and altered by unauthorized parties unless there 
are mechanisms preventing it.  
 
Despite the security related challenges of the mobile apps, they have gained lot 
of popularity. Today, all financial mobile apps in Europe are required to fulfill 
regulatory specifications that tie the user identity to the smartphone [4]. Also, 
there exist some generic mobile apps (like national electronic id app) that can be 
used like an electronic passport. 
 
 
1.3 The future 
 
One future scenario about the digital services is that they could be supplied to 
the consumers autonomously (but of course by the consent of the user). 
Advanced development of the computer vision may help to identify the persons 
“on-the-fly” without any explicit maneuvers done by the individuals. The rich data 
that can be collected continuously from the users by various sensors of the mobile 
devices are input source for machine learning algorithms. These algorithms can 
support user authentication and various other useful purposes. 
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2 Basic concepts and definitions 
 
 
Many of the concepts and terms are not generally expected to be known by the 
reader of this thesis. In particular, the chapters that contain elements of the 
cryptography may be difficult without background knowledge. The following 
chapters try to list and clarify the most important concepts and terms that are 
discussed in deeper level later. 
 
 
2.1 Authentication 
 
In computing, the term authentication is used for a process of verifying the identity 
of the user (person). Also, the authentication can mean verifying the identity of a 
device. Furthermore, the use cases of transaction verification have similarities to 
the verifying the identity of the user. In transaction verification, the user is 
requested to assert if the presented details about the transaction are correct and 
if the user accepts them (for example payment in a web shop). 
 
 
2.2 Single sign-on 
 
In the single sign-on (SSO) model [5] [6] [7] the end-users are using a single 
digital identity when they are logging into many different software systems. In 
some early implementations of the single sign-on the users had one common 
username/password pair, that they could use when they logged into the related 
systems. Single sign-on has traditionally been popular in corporate use. 
 
 
2.3 Federated login 
 
The federated login (FID) is related to the single sign-on [8]. In FID, the end-user 
may also login to various software systems using single digital identity. Federated 
login means that the software system assigns the task of authentication to an 
external authentication system. In the federated login concept, the assignor 
software system is called typically as relying party and the assignee, the external 
authentication system, as identity provider. The assignor software system can 
also be called as service provider in a certain context where the trust dependency 
between the parties is not specially under interest. 
 
 
2.4 Mobile app authenticator  
 
In this thesis, the term mobile app authenticator covers all mobile applications for 
smartphones that execute strong authentication during their usage. Mobile app 
authenticator may be purpose built for authentication use only. Also, the generic 
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mobile apps, whose main purpose is other than just authentication (for example 
financial management apps) are classified as mobile app authenticators in this 
thesis when they include a strong authentication component. Mobile applications 
that do not use strong authentication are not covered here. 
 
 
2.5 Strong authentication  
 
Today the term strong authentication [9] can be seen as variation of the term 
multi-factor authentication. The challenges of the terminology are explained later 
in chapter 3.1. The logical basis of the strong authentication is to have at least 
two of the three authentication elements in the authentication process of the end-
user. These elements are knowledge, possession and inherence. 
 
Knowledge can be for example a password that only the user knows. It is 
important regarding this factor that the information is not shared with anyone else 
than the user or stored anywhere in an unprotected format.  
 
The possession element is typically met when the user has a dedicated device 
(for example, mobile phone) which is used to perform the authentication. It is 
questionable if shared devices can fulfill the requirements of possession.  
 
Inherence refers to use-cases where individual properties of a human are used 
to prove the identity. These individual properties may be, for example, fingerprint 
or even keyboard typing patterns. 
 
 
2.6 Personal identification number 
 
The personal identification number (PIN) [10] has been common knowledge 
based authentication method for decades. PIN is a sequence of numbers that 
user has selected to identify himself/herself. Randomness of the PIN is crucial for 
the security of the authentication scheme. 
 
PIN has been used, for example, with automated teller machines of banks, 
accessing Wi-Fi networks and answering machines supplied by teleoperators. 
 
 
2.7 Blockchain 
 
Blockchain [11] [12] is based on a linked list of records (blocks). Each block in 
the chain is tied cryptographically to the previous block. This creates a recursive 
cryptographic proof of the data validity in the chain. No block can be altered 
without breaking the cryptographic proof of the chain.  
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2.8 White box cryptography 
 
Normally the cryptographic keys used by computer programs are observable by 
such foreign parties who can access the program runtime, with the help of specific 
tools. This possibility reduces the security of the programs and make them 
vulnerable to attacks. 
 
White box cryptography is a methodology that reduces the observability down to 
a point where the access to keys may require so much effort that it exceeds the 
possible gain [13] To achieve this low level of observability the keys and the used 
cryptographic algorithms are altered in multiple ways. These alterations are 
explained later in this thesis. 
 
 
2.9 Public key cryptography 
 
Public key cryptography [14] is cryptographic concept that is based on a 
mathematically tied key pair. One of the keys in the pair is public and can be 
shared freely. Another key (private key) is confidential and should always be kept 
secret. 
 
Public key cryptography offers two main functions: authentication and encrypting. 
For example, if sender of a message wants to ensure the confidentiality of the 
message content, he/she can encrypt the message payload with the public key 
of the receiver. Only the holder (owner) of the private key can successfully 
decrypt the message and so only the receiver is able to access the payload. 
 
Authentication in the public key cryptography is based on digital signatures. The 
digital signature is generated by a signature algorithm that uses the private key 
and piece of data as input. Anyone with access to the public key can verify that 
the signature was created using the private key. The verification is performed by 
signature validation algorithm. 
 
 
2.10  Public key infrastructure  
 
Public key cryptography, which was briefly explained in the previous chapter, can 
be applied to real-life use-cases several ways. One common way is to use public 
key infrastructure (PKI) [15].  
 
PKI consists typically roles, policies, technical standards and a central certificate 
authority (CA) to manage the digital certificates. The digital certificates are issued 
to the entities owning private keys. Typically, the CA signs the certificate that 
contains an identity, a corresponding public key and some other information such 
as the expiration time of the certificate. 
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2.11  Identity and access management 
 
As the user authentication and user role management have been very important 
features in the enterprise software systems from the very beginning, a specific 
industry has risen around the problem area.  
 
Identity and access management (IAM) is the industry which supplies software, 
standards and solutions around the authentication, access management and 
user role management. The global IAM business market size was estimated to 
be 9,53 billion USD in year 2018 [16]. 
 
 
 
3 Statement of the problem 
 
 
We have a premise that the mobile app authenticators became one of the most 
successful strong authentication solution during the last decade.  The premise is 
based on various observations. For example, there has appeared number of new 
companies on the current identity and access management (IAM) markets 
supplying mobile application as their main offering. Additionally, the surrounding 
legal frameworks in IAM and payments area (in Europe specially) has been set 
in a way that the mobile authentication use-cases have been clearly identified 
and supported.  
 
Generally speaking, high proportion of companies are doing business 
successfully with a strategy that the mobile applications are their main user 
interaction channel. If they need payments and they do business in Europe, they 
likely must use strong authentication by the regulation. 
 
In this thesis, we try to find out the factors that helped the mobile app 
authenticators to gain popularity. We try to gather information about how the 
mobile app authenticators are typically constructed and how they work. With this 
information, we can reflect the current situation to the future and try to state 
potential scenarios about the development. We set the question: what could be 
the next generation of strong authentication solutions and how they are built? 
 
Also, we explore the potential threats against mobile app authenticators. These 
threats may be factors that affect to the popularity of the current strong 
authentication solutions. They may assist the rise of the next generation solutions 
that perhaps address the challenges seen with the current ones. 
 
 
 
3.1 Challenges and limitations 
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One major challenge is the terminology of the strong authentication. There are 
multiple overlapping terms used for “strong authentication”. Some information 
sources and publications handle this through a term two-factor authentication 
(2FA). Two-factor authentication means an authentication process that has two 
phases. At the first phase, the user typically uses the username/password pair. 
The second phase is often performed by using additional device like hardware 
token or mobile phone. 
 
After common stabilized usage of the term 2FA, appeared the second European 
payment services directive (PSD2) and the regulatory technical standard (RTS) 
about strong customer authentication and secure communication [4]. These were 
published by the European Union and the European Banking Authority (EBA). 
 
PSD2 and the related RTS defined the term Strong Customer Authentication 
(SCA). SCA, by the definition in the regulation, requires that the system identifies 
the person with at least two independent factors. On the other hand, a term multi-
factor authentication is sometimes used. 
 
Yet another confusing term exist in some commercial surveys regarding usability 
of the authentication. In some publications, the term push may cover there all the 
mobile authentication apps that utilize push notifications to notify end-user. 
However, the push notification is not a mandatory element for a mobile app based 
authentication scheme. So, the classification of the mobile app authenticators 
around the word push is questionable. 
 
 
 
4 Common authentication solutions 
 
 
Various weak and strong authentication (or 2-factor authentication) methods 
have been available for commercial use for decades. As stated before, the usage 
of the strong authentication methods has been common first in other than 
consumer targeted services: military, corporate, government services etc. The 
adoption of the strong authentication has later been spread to the services for 
consumers due the legislation and the rising common knowledge about the 
security risks, for example, in banking.  
 
Strong authentication can be built on multiple authentication methods that have 
varying security levels. We also cover some old weaker legacy authentication 
methods here because they can (depending on the requirements) be used as 
individual authentication factors forming together the strong authentication. 
 
 
4.1 Hardware tokens  
 
Hardware tokens are peripheral devices that are used to allow access to 
restricted resources. They can be connected or disconnected. 
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Typically, the tokens are used in combination with a computer to perform 
authentication to a restricted resource like bank web site or corporate system. 
Disconnected token does not have a physical or logical connection to the 
computer. Hardware code generator is common example of this type of a token. 
 
Connected tokens do interact with the computer during the authentication event. 
They may be connected to the computer through physical communication 
interface like USB-port or through wireless connection (Bluetooth for example). 
 
The WebAuthn [17] and previous U2F/UAF standards of the FIDO consortium 
have generated a common authentication framework for using hardware tokens 
for authentication in mobile and browser environments. This has helped 
connected tokens to gain popularity over the traditional non-connected tokens. 
 
 
4.1.1 Tokens with input mechanism 
 
It is possible that hardware has an input mechanism for a PIN (personal 
identification number) or biometric input mechanism like fingerprint scanner [18]. 
This is remarkable enhancement if we think the strong authentication factors and 
the strength of the authentication performed with the token.  
 
Hardware token that has no input mechanism supplies only the possession factor 
of the strong authentication. The user can prove during the authentication 
process that he/she has access to a specific pre-registered hardware token. But 
it is not proved that the user is the person who the token is registered to. 
 
Token with PIN input capability allows the access to the authentication 
functionalities only for a person who knows the PIN. Of course, the PIN can 
theoretically be guessed by very small likelihood or user can share it to another 
user, (which typically violates the terms of the service). However, the PIN brings 
the additional knowledge factor to the authentication. So, the authentication event 
performed with PIN equipped hardware token supplies two factors of the strong 
authentication. 
 
Hardware token having a biometric input mechanism has the inherence factor of 
the strong authentication in addition to the possession. Some practical examples 
of this type of hardware token are Feitian BioPass-series that have fingerprint 
reader [19] and Yubikey Bio tokens by Yubico [20]. During the initialization of this 
type of token the fingerprint of the user is scanned and stored securely into the 
token. After this, the authentication functionalities of the token cannot be 
accessed without presenting the registered fingerprint.  
 
 
4.1.2 Public key cryptography with hardware tokens 
 
Public key cryptography (PKC) is common useful technology with hardware 
tokens. The public key concept of the PKC can be treated as the identity of the 
end-user. And the cryptographic signatures calculated on the private key can be 
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seen as an analogy to the consent of the user or a permission granted by the 
person.  
 
However, the authentication using hardware token and public key cryptography 
requires typically multi-directional communication between the parties involved 
into the process. The authentication system must have communication channels 
and protocols supporting this.  
 
 
The communication requirements of PKC with hardware tokens 
 
We can set following questions, when examining the communication 
requirements of an authentication with PKC and hardware token (specially in an 
online service context). 
 
The authentication using PKC is based on digital signatures. The capability to 
build digital signatures requires access to the private key that is protected by the 
PIN. How the end-user is able to input the PIN code to the token? 
 
The digital signing algorithms require a source message as one input parameter. 
How to transmit the source message for the digital signing process inside the 
token? 
 
It is possibly required, that the end-user must see the authentication request 
details during the authentication [4]. How these details are shown to the end-
user? 
 
The digital signing algorithms produce signatures which must be verified by the 
party which controls the access to the protected resource. In the context of the 
online services this means that the backend server or separate authentication 
server of the service must verify the signature. How the signature is transferred 
to the verification process? 
 
 
Standardized communication channels and protocols 
 
Standardized communication channels and protocols bring answers to the 
questions and challenges mentioned in the previous chapter. Standard API and 
interconnection protocols generate major benefits for the application developers 
specially if the system is designed to allow usage of tokens from many vendors.  
 
PKCS#11 [21]  is one notable standard for hardware tokens. It defines the 
standard programming API (application programming interface) for the vendor 
specific software libraries. The authentication system components running in a 
client computer (practically a PC) can connect to the hardware token and utilize 
the PKC services through this API. 
 
The following is an example of an authentication sequence through the PKCS#11 
API from the point of view of an application developer. 
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1. polling the presence of the physical token 
2. generating a session to the token (PIN is required as input to open the 
session and access to the memory) 
3. enumerating the key identifiers and certificates from the token in order to 
check if the token is initialized into the actual use 
4. initialization of a signing event (setting the signed content into the shared 
memory and selecting the signature scheme) 
5. committing the signing event 
6. finishing the signing event 
7. closing the session to the token 
 
 
Hardware tokens in the web context 
 
One example of the involved parties and required messaging of an authentication 
using PKC and hardware tokens in web context is presented in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2. However, it is notable to mention as a disclaimer for these figures that 
the web browser manufacturers have set major limitations during the last decade 
regarding the connectivity possibilities to native libraries.  
 
Formerly the browsers supported widely a common API named NPAPI, that 
defined various programming interfaces for accessing native services outside the 
browser sandbox [22]. This enabled also accessing the functionalities of the 
connected hardware tokens. However, the NPAPI support has been deprecated 
from majority of the browsers [23] [24] [25]. It is possible that the NPAPI brought 
too much security risks compared to the benefits and so the browser 
manufacturers considered it better to discontinue the support. 
 
On the other hand, during the fadeout of the NPAPI support there has risen a 
new series of standards based on the same problem area. FIDO consortium has 
published UAF, U2F, WebAuthn and CTAP standards to support strong 
authentication in web and mobile environments [17]. FIDO has addressed the 
challenge of the communication between the browser environment and the 
authenticator by defining set of APIs and communication protocols. In order to 
succeed, the FIDO standards need support from the all major browser 
manufacturers (Google, Microsoft, Apple, Mozilla). The required adoption seems 
not being achieved yet as the support from Apple is missing [26]. 
 
 15 
 
Figure 1 Simplified authentication flow using connected hardware token in a web 
environment. PART 1 
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Figure 2 Simplified authentication flow using connected hardware token in a web 
environment. PART 2 
 
 
 
4.2 Hardware code generators 
 
Hardware code generator is typically plastic, battery powered digital device with 
LCD display for showing code that changes based on time [27]. The code is 
generated by a purpose-built digital circuit board that has an internal clock, 
persistent memory for a seed value and processing unit for the code generation 
algorithm. The seed is a value that is essential for the randomness of the code 
generation algorithm (and so essential for the security of the device). Typically, 
the seed is initialized into the token during the manufacturing process. 
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One popular standard for the timely basis changing codes is TOTP (Time-based 
One-Time Password algorithm). TOTP is defined by the RFC 6238 memo of the 
IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) [28]. TOTP code generation algorithm is 
based on common shared secret between the server and client devices and the 
shared opinion about global time. The “time” means a certain physical time 
window, usually 30 seconds when the code stays the same.  
 
Usually there may be some deviations in the time state between client and server. 
This is more likely to happen with offline devices that rely only on the internal 
clock of the circuit board and cannot reach any reference time from the network. 
These time deviations caused by clock drift may generate problems when the 
server checks the code calculated by the client. Common solution to compensate 
these deviations is that the server generates reference codes from the nearest 
time windows and compares the code also against them. 
 
Hardware code generators can be classified to belong to the category of 
hardware tokens that is a broader class of various authentication devices. One of 
the most common hardware code generator in the commercial use has been RSA 
SecurId [29] that has been popular, for example, in corporate use. 
 
 
4.3 Smart cards 
 
Someone may set a question if a smart card is a hardware token or vice versa. 
The question relates to the fact that the cryptographic hardware modules are 
manufactured in various form factors. There are, for example, hardware security 
modules (HSM), that typically come as standalone box-shaped devices to be 
installed into a server rack. Then there are hardware tokens that are hand held 
gadget-like items. And after all there are the smart cards that have cryptographic 
capabilities as well. 
 
We take the freedom to describe smart cards separately from the hardware 
tokens here. The typical form factor of the common smart card like SIM card of a 
mobile phone or EMV credit card with embedded chip is different than, for 
example, typical security token with a USB connector.  
 
Smart cards are used widely in the payment industry as specific purpose-built 
solution for accepting payment transactions (EMV cards). Also, in the mobile 
industry the SIM card is the backbone of the identity of the mobile subscriber and 
the core services. SIM card can even support the subscriber identity services to 
custom applications through the SIM Toolkit functions that are standardized by 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [30].  
 
SIM Toolkit services is good basis for authentication solutions in mobile phone 
environments. The SIM card is designed to function as PKI backed cryptographic 
root of trust that is the hardest part to implement for an authentication system as 
we see later in this study.  
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Despite the excellent cryptographic foundation and enrollment of the root of trust 
the SIM Toolkit solutions have not turned out as widely adopted commercial 
success. One possible reason for this is the fact that standard SIM Toolkit 
functions have had limitations regarding the graphic user experience (in 
comparison to the current user experience standards in the smartphones). Also, 
the SIM Toolkit functionalities are deployed into the SIM by the mobile operator, 
so the commercial solutions require co-operation with the mobile operator that 
can be bureaucratic and slow. This might have reduced the popularity of the SIM 
Toolkit authentication. Same time the freedom of the iOS and Android app 
development brings great opportunities for even small companies to publish 
authentication solutions on the markets. 
 
 
4.4 Chip authentication program 
 
The Chip Authentication Program (CAP) is a technical specification developed by 
MasterCard. Basic idea behind it is to allow using banking smartcards for 
authenticating users online. Visa also adopted this technology under the name 
Dynamic Passcode Authentication (DPA). Details of the protocol are not public, 
but  
researchers in Computer Laboratory of University of Cambridge reverse 
engineered the system and published a paper describing the protocol functional 
principles [31]. They also found out some weaknesses in the protocol. 
 
When utilizing the CAP in authentication to online services, the end-user has the 
smartcard, a physical smartcard reader with number pad and display and a PC. 
PIN is used by the user to get access to the card after insertion of the card into 
the reader. Authentication is implemented by dedicated cryptographic challenge-
response protocol between the online service (via PC) and the EMV card. The 
sequence is described in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 The CAP challenge-response protocol as described in the paper Optimised to 
Fail: Card Readers for Online Banking, Saar Drimer, Steven J. Murdoch, and Ross 
Anderson, 2009 
 
 
4.5 Transaction authentication numbers 
 
One 2-factor authentication method for online services has been the transaction 
authentication numbers (TAN). They are one-time passwords generated and 
printed to paper by the issuer. Transaction authentication numbers has been 
simple low-cost solution for banks [32].  
 
TAN has usually an index and the matching number for the index. During 
authentication or transaction verification the online service presents the index 
number and the end-user must type a TAN matching the index.  
 
Transaction authentication numbers can be used sequentially or by random 
selection of the index. When the index transmission is completed on an auxiliary 
side-channel like SMS or phone call, the authentication is seen to fulfill the 
requirements for a PSD2 SCA by the European Banking Authority [9] . 
 
One drawback of the transaction authentication numbers is that they have quite 
limited amount of combinations due the amount of numbers used. So, the 
transaction authentication numbers are prone to brute force attack unless there 
are additional countermeasures deployed. In brute force attack the attacker may, 
for example, harness automated robots to try the authentication with random 
numbers. Also, the numbers can be copied and shared among users, which is a 
risk. 
 
 20 
Typically, the input forms of authentication are throttled to mitigate the risk of 
brute force attacks. Throttling means that the system limits the amount of 
(authentication) requests allowed to enter into processing.    
 
 
 
4.6 Short message service 
 
The short message services (SMS) [33] of the mobile networks have lost 
popularity in common use as the 3G and later networks have allowed the usage 
of the internet protocols in mobile phones. Shortly, the internet displaced the short 
messages by bringing the rich multi-media content easily available for the end-
users. However, the possibility to send short messages still exist in the 
smartphones. 
 
As the mobile networks and SIM-units in the mobile phones are backed by the 
PKI system, the SMS has been seen as a reliable channel for sending one-time 
codes or challenge codes for transaction authentication numbers.  
 
However, several successful attacks on the SS7 network as tracking of 
subscribers, eavesdropping and SMS redirecting was performed during year 
2014 [34]. SMS brings vulnerabilities also in the mobile device. The SMS content 
can be read by various malware attacks inside the device [35].  
 
In addition to the aforementioned pure technical vulnerabilities the SMS can be 
attacked with SIM-swapping that is human operated attack. In SIM-swapping 
attack the attacker gathers information about the victim and uses this information 
to impersonate him/herself as the victim when contacting the mobile operator. If 
attacker succeeds to convince the mobile operator personnel, the telephone 
number of the victim is associated to the SIM held by the attacker. After this the 
attacker receives the short messages that are intended for the victim.  
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in U.S has addressed this 
potential attack scenario in their Digital Identity Guidelines 800-63B. They classify 
this attack under social engineering threats. NIST describes this attack shortly by 
following description. “An out of band secret sent via SMS is received by an 
attacker who has convinced the mobile operator to redirect the victim’s mobile 
phone to the attacker.” [36] 
 
As conclusion, the SMS should be seen only as a weakly protected side channel 
for multi-factor authentication, not as a sole strong authentication solution. 
 
 
4.7 Legacy and backup methods: security questions & email  
 
Online users forget often their credentials to the websites. Traditionally this 
problem has been solved by backing up the account by weak authentication 
methods like private question/answer-pairs that are called “security questions”. 
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When user has answered correctly to the questions he/she is permitted to enter 
the service and reset the lost password.  
 
Security questions are nowadays even less secure than they were in the days 
when they were invented. As the personal information has become more public 
by various data leaks and by the possibilities of social engineering, the answers 
to security questions are too easily available. For example, Ariel Rabkin from 
University of California estimated in his survey about security questions among 
banks in U.S, that this method may become dangerously insecure. [37] 
 
Email has also traditionally been used for the backup authentication method for 
online services. It has been used mostly for gaining access to the account when 
the credentials have been lost. The example sequence of the resetting logic is 
presented in Figure 4. 
 
Email has major weaknesses regarding authentication. The access to the email 
account is typically device independent and protected only by a username and 
password. Passwords of email accounts also leak easily from misconfigured 
clients. NIST Special Publication 800-63 gives strong guidance that email should 
not be used for single factor or multi-factor authentication. [36] 
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Figure 4 Password reset with email 
 
 
 
4.8 Biometric authentication 
 
Traditionally the authentication has relied on the secret information or on the 
possession of a device like hardware token or a smart card. Specially the need 
to carry an external authentication device has possibly been one motivation of 
inventing authentication schemes based on inherence. Obvious question is: Why 
to carry a device if you are the “device” that can be used to prove your identity. 
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4.8.1 Fingerprint reading 
 
A long before the digital age, the fingerprint has been found as unique property 
of a person. Traces of fingerprint have been traditionally used for evidence 
collection in crime investigations. As the technology became accurate enough to 
scan the fingerprint reliably and the algorithms became quick and accurate 
enough to verify the human identity, the fingerprint became the dominant 
biometric authentication method in digital environments. [38]  
 
Fingerprint reading has been combined in various technical form factors. One 
possible way to implement it is to add fingerprint reading pad into a hardware 
token. For example, Yubico has utilized this approach in their popular Yubikey 
series tokens. [39] 
 
Some trials have also been made to combine the fingerprint reading to EMV card. 
Major credit card issuers like Visa and Mastercard have advertised about their 
development programs regarding this. [40] [41] This is natural development as 
the EMV cards have many similarities with hardware tokens regarding the basic 
functionalities, usage and enrollment. 
 
However, the environment where the major success has happened regarding the 
adoption of this authentication technology is the smartphone. Today major part 
of the smartphones on the markets do have the fingerprint scanner. The scanning 
is used for many different use-cases starting already from the access of the 
phone. Also, the scanning is available for the mobile app makers by the APIs of 
the mobile operating system. 
 
 
4.8.2 Face recognition 
 
The history of the face recognition dates back to 1960’s when Woodrow Wilson 
Bledsoe developed a manual system that could classify photos of faces. [42] 
Wilson’s method utilized a special RAND tablet that was manually operated to 
locate certain facial properties from the pictures. The data of the processed image 
and associated identity were stored in a database. Later, the system could use a 
method based on distances between facial features to search the best matching 
picture from the database (compared to the provided picture). 
 
Lots of development has happened since the first semi-automated face 
recognition attempts. Today the evolution of the computer vision technology and 
artificial intelligence has enabled deployment of the face recognition to various 
uses. Most common implementations are access control systems, for example, 
in airports. However, the most interesting use-cases for this thesis are the 
examples where the face recognition is used for web authentication or access to 
other digital services. Perhaps the most notable success in this category has 
been the Apple Face ID: the user authentication mechanism for certain high-end 
Apple smartphones. [43] 
 
One challenge for the face recognition based authentication has traditionally 
been the liveness detection: the detection systems have been vulnerable to 
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attacks where the static 2D-image of the identity owner has been presented to 
the recognition mechanism and the authentication passed successfully. More 
advanced 3D face recognition methods have been developed to enhance the 
security. [44]  Also the various sensors available today in smartphone 
environments have been explored as a solution to rise the security. [45]  
 
 
 
5 Requirements for a successful authentication 
scheme 
 
 
The replacement alternatives for the password authentication scheme have been 
explored tens of years. Researchers have found various schemes that are more 
secure than passwords. This is not surprising as it is widely known that the 
password authentication scheme has major problems regarding security. There 
are various on-line or off-line attack vectors against passwords. On the other 
hand, there are also user originated problem categories (password sharing etc.). 
 
 
5.1 The four-factor model 
 
Research made by Joseph Bonneau et. al.  [46] [47] bring interesting views to 
the discussion about what are the factors that make the authentication scheme 
successful. One view is that research has possibly been focused too much on 
security. Schemes more secure than passwords have existed tens of years, but 
yet none of them is as widespread as passwords. The presented conclusion is 
that, to achieve worldwide adoption, the authentication scheme must be secure, 
highly usable and incur low costs. It is not enough to excel only in one or two of 
these categories. All three are necessary. 
 
The tradeoff between security, cost and usability is mentioned also in the book 
LTE Security [48]. One main idea presented there is that the cost of implementing 
the security mechanism must be reasonable when compared to the value of the 
protected resource. Also, we must be aware that high amount of security 
mechanisms applied to a system may typically reduce the usability. It must be 
considered what is the threshold level of the worsening usability that should not 
be exceeded. How much can the end-user accept the inconvenience brought by 
the security? 
 
In addition to this academic research, there is additional view brought by 
commercial strong authentication solution vendor Nok Nok Labs inc. They have 
pointed that the privacy is the fourth major factor that must be taken into account 
when designing an authentication scheme. [49] The criticality of privacy has risen 
after the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of European Union [50] has 
been set into force. Especially the biometric data that is used to authenticate user 
must be protected adequately against theft. 
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As conclusion, the properties of an authentication scheme may be estimated or 
measured in four scales. The overall goodness of the scheme can be visualized 
by the Figure 5.  
 
In the visualization, all the four factors have own scale running from center to the 
corners. Corners of the dashed rectangle indicate the value for each factor in their 
own individual scale. In the sample figure, the usability factor is relatively low and 
the low-cost factor is high (meaning that the cost is low). Total area inside the 
dashed lines expresses the score: the greater the area, the better. However, it is 
notable that the four scales in this model cannot be directly compared and cannot 
be used for accurate measurements. The model tries only to visualize the 
paradigm. 
 
 
Figure 5: The 4 factors affecting to the popularity of an authentication scheme 
 
 
 
5.2 Usability in the strong authentication 
 
The usability of 2-factor authentication methods has been explored in various 
studies during last decade. [51] [52] [53] [54] [55]. Comparisons between different 
studies is difficult because of various reasons. The results can be seen 
contradictory and complex. Sometimes the research has been targeted to only 
single authentication method. On the other hand, the contexts are different 
among studies. Research has been conducted in various environments like 
banking, university et cetera.  
 
Some observations have been found out in all sources: The 2-factor 
authentication seems to feel annoying for the end-users irrespective of the 
method.  
 
Common recommendation for the 2-factor authentication implementations is that 
the number of the steps should be kept minimal. [54] 
 
There was some evidence supporting the hypothesis that the solutions based on 
the push notifications were most popular among the users. For example, Jessica 
Colnago et al from Carnegie Mellon University and University of California found 
out in their study [54] that the three most popular methods used were push 
notification (91%), app-generated passcode (21%), and hard token (4%). Push 
notification was here used to invoke an authenticator app, Duo Mobile. Also study 
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from Ken Reese et al from Brigham Young University found out in their usability 
study of different 2-factor methods that the push notification approach 
(authenticator app) and U2F security keys helped the end-user to reduce login 
time [51]. Also, the push notification approach took the second least set-up time. 
Paper based transaction authentication numbers were faster to set-up in the 
study.  
 
In addition to these results presented by academic groups there exist some 
commercial survey material about the usability in the authentication. One 
interesting survey is made by Duo Security inc. [56] They found out some 
contradictory results between the usability of push notification-based approaches 
and security keys. On the other hand, the security keys enjoyed greatest number 
in the question “I enjoyed using it” but also greatest number for the question 
“using it was stressful” or “using it was frustrating”. However, the push-based 
approach was successful in many questions indicating good usability.  
 
Based on these surveys we set a question: is the push notification a critical factor 
in success of mobile app authenticators? On the other point of view, the push 
notification can be seen also as a feature that may reduce the security. End-users 
may accidentally accept transaction by habit if a hacker is able to initiate the 
transaction by guessing the username, phone number or other weak id of the 
end-user. Identity phishing is a rising concern for commercial services. 
 
 
5.3 Cost, privacy and security 
 
Security is very fundamental factor for an authentication method. It is therefore 
discussed further in dedicated chapters later in this thesis. Also, the value of 
privacy has also risen lately. In particular, the European general data protection 
regulation (GDPR) has set new standards for the privacy in the online services 
[50]. Due the limited scope of this thesis we must leave the privacy out of further 
examination. The same scope limitation applies to the cost factor. Nevertheless, 
the cost is important when we look for wide adoption and possible commercial 
success of an authentication solution. 
 
 
 
6 Architecture of the mobile app authenticator  
 
 
As stated before, most of the people in the western world are smartphone users 
[1] [2] today. Mobile apps are becoming the common way to solve everyday tasks 
like making daily purchases, managing financial affairs or maintaining social 
relationships. Many of the daily tasks require authentication. Many tasks require 
using strong authentication for the security reasons. Result of this long-term 
development has been that the mobile app makers have started to include strong 
authentication features to their systems or even developed separate purpose-
built authenticator apps. 
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Also, companies doing business in the security and IAM sector have notified their 
opportunities here. Implementing the strong authentication properly requires 
special skills that regular mobile app makers do not necessary have. The 
following chapters illustrate the common concepts and building blocks of the 
mobile app authenticators and try to address the challenges that the developers 
may meet. 
 
Mobile app authenticators can be built on many different architectural models: 
basic client-server model, edge computing model and peer-to-peer overlay 
networks, for example. 
 
Computing power of the mobile devices gives much freedom for the mobile app 
authenticator designers regarding the architecture. Also, the wide scale of the 
services available by the mobile app platform may steer the designer to 
implement many computational tasks in the mobile device instead of the server. 
When we compare this, for example, to mainframe computing systems that were 
popular in industrial and financial institution use during many decades we see the 
change of the paradigm. On the other hand, battery life is one of the major 
concerns in mobile devices and this may slow down the development of pure 
peer-to-peer authentication solutions. [57] 
 
 
6.1 Peer-to-peer architecture 
 
One of the interesting questions in the peer-to-peer of architecture is the source 
of the trust. If the designer of an authentication system see that the mobile app 
authenticator should have no central root of trust and the authenticators should 
be equal peers in the network, the architecture can be based on distributed 
ledger, as in blockchain architectures. 
 
One special requirement for a peer-to-peer architecture for mobile app 
authenticators is that there must exist special proxy nodes in the architecture in 
addition to the peers (mobile apps). Reason for this requirement is that the mobile 
phone networks do not support interconnectivity between the peers (by other than 
voice calls and SMS-messaging). A mobile phone and the apps running in it 
cannot act as a server because the inbound messaging on suitable protocols may 
be very limited by the network.  
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Figure 6 Generic sample architecture – peer-to-peer overlay network of mobile 
authenticator apps and supporting proxy nodes 
  
 
In peer-to-peer architecture it is also notable that the system data may be 
distributed. In distributed model the data is not stored in a central data source 
where all the peers should connect in order to make queries or updates. Instead, 
the peers (all or special nodes in the overlay network) hold the data by 
themselves. How data is distributed, affects to the data redundancy, query 
latency, and data availability and other major architectural properties of the 
system, like scalability.  
 
Hany F. Atlam et.al stated that the “large scale” is a challenge for the IoT (Internet 
of Things) networks in cloud computing [58]. The interconnecting activities among 
the devices (peers) require carefully designed algorithms and data distribution 
design to perform in the large scale.  
 
Benefits of a peer-to-peer architecture are, for example: 
 
• No central authority is required 
 
• Control of the personal data may stay in the peers 
 
• System may support peer anonymity 
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• Data may be distributed among the peers, that may allow faster response 
times for data queries. 
 
• Computational efforts may be distributed and scheduled evenly across the 
peers 
 
 
 
Disadvantages of a peer-to-peer architecture are, for example: 
 
• Intercommunication between the peers may require noticeable amount of 
network traffic 
 
• Data redundancy may be high unless the distribution algorithm is carefully 
designed 
 
• System scalability is bad due the abovementioned reasons 
 
• Anonymity may support criminal activities 
 
Arguments presented above may however be questioned also. For example, the 
lack of a central authority can be seen as advantage or disadvantage depending 
on the point of view. 
 
 
6.1.1 Distributed ledger and the blockchain 
 
Blockchain [12] [59] has been explored intensively for the IoT (Internet of Things) 
use during the last decade [60]. Reasons leading to the rising interest of 
blockchain solutions have likely been the concern about common security in 
internet and the dominance of the major companies doing the business there (like 
Apple, Google, Microsoft, Alibaba and Tencent).  
 
Basic idea of the blockchain is that the data is stored into nodes of a linked list. 
The nodes of the list are incrementally and cryptographically signed. No node can 
be altered in the chain without violating the cryptographic proof of the chain 
authenticity.  
 
One well-articulated and simplified description of the distributed ledger concept 
is written into the developer documents of IBM. They define it as “type of 
database that is shared, replicated, and synchronized among the members of a 
decentralized network.” [11]  Distributed ledger and the blockchain can be used 
together to create a distributed authentication system. Many times, especially in 
the commercial publications, the concept of distributed ledger is left out and only 
the popularized term blockchain is used to describe a system that is based on 
both distributed ledger and blockchain.  
 
One of the main benefits in the combined distributed ledger and blockchain 
concept is that the trust of the system and the peers is distributed; no central 
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authority is required to ensure the authenticity of the peers or the stored data [60] 
[61]. The trust is thus de-centralized.  
 
In popularized publications related to “blockchain” the data is generally 
mentioned to be distributed into the peers. Distribution is generally speaking 
beneficial for networked systems, for example, in order to increase computing 
parallelism and system performance. However, the concept of distributed data 
may be implemented in various ways. In some cases, the term distributed may 
refer to a model where the peers do not hold same data ledger, but a small portion 
of it instead. Sharded Merkle tree [62]  would be an example of this. On the other 
hand, the term distributed may refer to a concept where the system data is 
replicated to identical copies held by all the nodes. 
 
Scaling is the major challenge for the peer-to-peer architectures. Blockchain and 
distributed ledger technology is not an automatic solution for the scaling problem. 
For example, the most known real life blockchain implementation, virtual currency 
Bitcoin [63], has performed poorly from the point of view of scalability [64].  
 
One of the biggest problems of the scalability of Bitcoin is the ledger distribution. 
In Bitcoin ecosystem, the ledger is copied to all mining nodes in the overlay 
network. The concept of mining refers to certain computational work that is 
operated by the mining nodes to prove the existence and authenticity of 
transactions in each block of the blockchain. Mining will not be described here 
further, but it generates the trust in the Bitcoin ecosystem.  
 
If all the peers must have the same redundant data about the all transactions 
made in the ecosystem, the system scales up badly. Anamica Chauhan et. al 
explored [65] the Bitcoin scalability and compared it to enhanced scaling 
concepts of the Ethereum. The results indicate that the ledger sharding 
mechanism enhances scaling of the blockchain system. 
 
 
6.1.2 Crowd-trust 
 
Another architecture candidate concept for a peer-to-peer authentication system 
could be a crowd-trust model. The concept crowd-trust means here a digital 
reputation value of the system members (peers), that is earned by manual 
reviews by the peers or by some automatic algorithmic approach of the system 
analyzing the transactions made among the peers. 
 
In this architecture, the peers would not be equal in terms of their reputation. The 
peers would gain reputation by their transactions and the feedback received 
either from the other peers (“crowd-trust”) or the system itself. The 
trustworthiness of their claims about transactions would be a probability value 
calculated by an algorithm. One of this kind of trust management schemes is 
presented by a study by Jaydip Sen [66]. 
 
 
 
 
 31 
6.2 Client-server architecture 
 
Usually the authentication platform that utilizes the mobile app authenticators is 
based on a model in which the authenticator apps are most of the time in contact 
with some central authority (client–server model).  
 
The typical architecture variants of the mobile apps are native client and web view 
based architectures (and any hybrids between these). [67] 
 
Figure 7 Simplified mobile app authenticator architecture based on cloud server backend 
and rich client. 
 
 
 
6.2.1 Web view based mobile apps 
 
Some could say that the easiest way to implement a mobile app today is based 
on web views. In this model, the app utilizes a standard web browser component 
supplied by the platform or common software development kits (SDK). The 
browser component loads content (for example HTML5) from a pre-defined URI 
and renders it to the screen. Major parts of the app logic are usually all coded into 
the HTML-content and runnable scripts (JavaScript) included. 
 
Web views are easy to implement for multiple mobile platforms simultaneously, 
which is a benefit. Also updates to the app may sometimes be handled by 
updating the HTML-content, so control is at the server side. Updating the app at 
device is not necessarily needed. [67] 
 
However, web views have some limitations that makes them less suitable choice 
as basis for an authenticator app. Typically, an authenticator app may need data 
or inputs from the sensors of the mobile device. The app may need access to 
native authentication services supplied by the platform (like fingerprint reading or 
facial recognition). Some years ago, when web views came available there was 
a great challenge to reach these functions from the web view. W3C has later 
published some libraries and common sensors API for this. [68]  Despite the 
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development of these functionalities in the mobile platforms, the complexity of 
reaching the native functionalities from webview seems to have stayed. 
 
Another challenge for a web view is that the authenticator app may need a secure 
persistent storage. For a mobile app authenticator, the word secure requires 
using encryption over the data staying in the storage. Access and management 
of cryptographic keys and using the cryptographic algorithms securely may be a 
challenge for a web view. 
 
 
6.2.2 Native mobile apps 
 
Native mobile apps are apps that are written directly for the target platform [69]. 
They are developed on programming languages like C and Java. Native apps 
render their user interface views without specific structural instructions like HTML. 
Native apps benefit from the features published by the operating system. Mobile 
platforms like Android and iOS supply today a great number of APIs and libraries 
for the developers of native apps.  
 
Downside of the native apps is that the app must typically be programmed 
independently to all different mobile platforms. Even there may be some common 
components, major part of the code cannot be shared due the fundamental 
differences of the platforms. Also, whenever there is a need for a functional 
change for the app, the app must be developed, tested and published through 
the development and publishing platform of the platform vendor. Publishing and 
acceptance may take days by the platform. Slowness is not optimal, for example, 
for critical security updates. 
 
Native app implementation strategy has major benefits in the authenticator app 
case. The tooling for making the apps, namely the libraries and APIs, are 
comprehensive. As mentioned in previous chapters, the access to sensor data 
and authentication functions like fingerprint reading, input of the access code, or 
facial recognition is important.  
 
Native low-level programming enables using security features like white box 
cryptography [13] that gives protection against many typical activities of the 
hackers. These activities include static reverse engineering of the app binaries to 
source code (that enables access to logic of the app), reverse engineering of the 
memory space of the app during runtime, and various other attack vectors. 
 
 
6.2.3 Hybrid mobile apps 
 
 In the hybrid model, the app contains a wrapper and a web view. It is 
questionable if there is any distinction between web view based app and hybrid 
mobile app. Classification is not clear. One possible distinctive feature could be 
the amount of the logic located in the web view. If there exist major logical parts 
in the both areas (native and dynamic web content) in the app, it could be claimed 
a hybrid app. 
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The wrapper  
 
The wrapper is a native part of the app and acts as a core for the web view. 
Wrapper may supply an API containing the access to the native platform features. 
[67] 
 
 
 
 
Pros and cons of the web view 
 
Both app categories have advantages in certain areas. However, in the 
authenticator app use the web view should be used only for functionalities that 
are not security critical. These are, for example, showing the terms of service. 
 
Table 1 Differences of the app categories. Source: Shruthi Sasidaran, Survey on Native 
and Hybrid Mobile Application Development Tools 2017 
 Native  Hybrid 
Development language Native languages: Java 
for Android Swift for iOS 
Native and web / web 
only 
Device specific features High Moderate 
Code portability None High 
UI/UX High Moderate 
Advanced graphics High Moderate 
Application store Available Available 
Development cost Expensive  Reasonable 
Device access Complete Complete 
Speed Fast Medium 
Access to native APIs High Moderate 
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6.3 Secure communication channel  
If we think the very basic requirements for the communication between the parties 
in the authentication system architecture, they could be following terms: mutual 
trust and confidentiality.  
 
There must be mutual trust between server and clients: mobile authenticator app 
must be sure that it is connected to a valid server and the server must be sure 
that the connected client is not a rogue one. If the architecture does not have a 
central authority, the same principle is still valid: the valid peers must have trust 
mechanisms to protect them from rogue peers. 
 
The system must preserve the data confidentiality i.e. it must be protected against 
eavesdropping. Typically, the authentication system handles personal data (even 
an authentication system based on pseudonymous identities if fully valid concept 
as we know from virtual currencies, for example). 
 
Naturally the communication channel and the protocol must suit the messaging 
design of the system. Some may prefer continuous stream of small messages 
sent on lower layers of the OSI model while other may find the classic sparsely 
used request/response pairs over HTTP adequate. 
  
 
6.3.1 Networking protocol 
 
Authenticator app designers have some alternatives for the networking solution 
between the app and the server. While the TCP could be good choice for a 
continuous type messaging between the app and the server (like is desired in 
gaming) the typical networking activity for an authenticator app might be just a 
certain sequence of request/response –pairs in a limited time scale. HTTP (over 
TLS) is good match for this. 
 
 
TLS 
 
Using transport layer security (TLS) [70] has become a de-facto security standard 
in various uses of HTTP. TLS utilizes asymmetric cryptography to protect the 
messaging confidentiality and can also optionally support mutual authentication 
between the messaging parties. Usually only the server is authenticated in web 
browsing usage, but in case of mobile app authenticator there must be a 
cryptographic mechanism to prove the identity of the client too. TLS client 
certificates is good candidate for this use. 
 
 
The threat of a man-in-the-middle attack 
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While the TLS supplies principally very good security for the messaging between 
the mobile apps and their corresponding server back-ends, the proxy setups with 
TLS termination may dilute the situation.  
 
A proxy server, as used in application layer communication in mobile networks, 
is a gateway that intercepts all traffic between the mobile device and public 
internet [71]. Proxy can also exist inside the mobile device as a software 
component that intercepts the traffic between apps and the network.  
 
In both cases the operating system and the networking components of the client 
can be configured (with the acceptance given by the end-user) so that the 
encryption of the TLS is decrypted in the proxy. Originally these proxy 
mechanisms have been built for good intentions like content filtering, bandwidth 
usage limitations and privacy but it contains also the risk for misuse in form of a 
man-in-the-middle attack in certain conditions. [71] 
 
One possible mitigation method against the man-in-the-middle threat is certificate 
pinning combined with an additional authentication and encryption layer 
implemented over the TLS networking. Also, this method should be built using 
white box cryptography at the client side to additionally slow down the efforts of 
the possible attackers. 
 
 
Figure 8 Traffic eavesdropping with a proxy and TLS termination 
 
 
Certificate pinning 
 
The main principle in the certificate pinning is that the client application ensures 
after successful TLS handshake that the presented certificate of the server is 
issued on a previously known or pre-configured public key. The assumed public 
key can be even hard-coded into the application if needed. Also, the client may 
be programmed to accept multiple alternative keys from a key set [72]. This 
allows the system, for example, to rotate the keys used. 
 
 36 
Certificate pinning can also be dynamic in a way that when a trusted connection 
between the parties has been established, the next assumed public key can be 
sent to the client and then stored securely. When the certificate pinning is used 
the requirements of using secure storage and app shielding technologies become 
important. This is covered in later chapters of this thesis. 
 
 
6.4 Authentication server 
 
One obvious architecture for an authentication system is the client-server 
architecture. The server, which is called authentication server in this thesis, has 
various important purposes in this architecture. Example of a generic 
authentication server architecture is presented in Figure 9. Concepts and the 
main components of this architecture are presented in the following chapters. 
 
 
Figure 9 Generic authentication server architecture 
  
 
6.4.1 Service Provider API 
 
Especially in the large enterprise architectures it is common that the 
authentication services are centralized to a single system. For example, a bank 
can have arranged the authentication of the customers so that they can use a 
mobile app authenticator to login to daily banking services and to stock trading 
service that are two totally different software systems.  
 
The aforementioned arrangement can be implemented by federated login 
concept. If we continue using the banking as example, the daily banking service 
application and the stock trading platform are relying parties for the authentication 
service that is the identity provider. 
 
 37 
The relying parties need to communicate with the identity provider in order to 
handle the tasks related to the authentication. In this example architecture, the 
Service Provider API is the interface that is used by the relying parties (service 
providers). The Service Provider API has endpoints for managing the end-user 
identities and associations. Also, it has endpoint for managing authentication 
events.  
 
It is beneficial for the Service Provider API, if it is designed to follow common 
standards regarding the interface specifications and the communication protocol. 
This is important because the standardized frameworks are typically well 
designed and reviewed regarding the security. Additionally, this may bring also 
cost reduction. Developers of the client applications may possibly utilize common 
purpose-built programming libraries instead of building all from the scratch. 
  
For federated identity management, there are some useful frameworks and 
standards that can be used with the Service Provider API. For example, Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 was published year 2005 [73]. It is still 
commonly used by many organizations even it may be seen technically slightly 
outdated. However, newer generation standards like OpenID Connect (OIDC) 
[74] are currently preferred for the Service Provider API. 
 
 
6.4.2 Authenticator API 
 
The mobile app authenticators need various services through their life cycle in 
the client-server architecture. In this example architecture, the Authenticator API 
is the interface that supplies the services. The API can be structured various 
ways. One possible solution is to arrange the API into endpoints based on the 
use-cases they are related to. For example, fetching open authentication 
requests and submitting the signatures can be served from the authentication 
endpoint as they belong to the authentication use-case. 
 
 
Registration endpoint 
 
The authenticator app needs to connect to the server immediately when the 
required cryptographic keys (we assume that the PKC is used) are generated. 
The authenticator must register the generated public key to the server for later 
use. Possibly the authenticator and server exchange other keys, attributes or 
shared secrets too depending on the implementation details. The registration 
endpoint of the Authenticator API supports these requirements. 
 
 
Authentication endpoint 
 
The authentication endpoint is needed for the authentication flow. For example, 
the mobile authenticator app needs to fetch the ongoing authentication requests 
that are sent by the service providers. Secondly the committed authentication 
requests and the cryptographic signatures must be sent back to the server for 
 38 
verification and further processing. Simplified generic authentication flow is 
presented in the Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10 Generic authentication flow using mobile app authenticator 
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7 Challenge to bootstrap the user identity  
 
 
Initialization of a mobile authenticator app securely is itself a challenging task. 
Vulnerability or weakness of any component in the mobile authenticator app 
ecosystem is a potential risk for fraudulent use or a data breach. The old cliché 
quote says that the chain is as strong as the weakest link in it. This saying can 
be applied to an authentication system where authentication events must leave 
an uninterrupted audit trail. 
 
 
7.1 The authenticity of the authenticator 
 
We have a generic problem about how to ensure that only valid client can be 
enrolled into an authentication system. A potential threat scenario to an 
authentication system is that a hacker with appropriate knowledge and tooling 
can listen the traffic and reverse engineer the communication protocol between 
clients and the server. By this information the hacker can either impersonate an 
existing client or deploy new fake clients into the system. 
 
The solution against eavesdropping and theft of the confidential information is 
that the clients have a strong shared secret between them and the server. This 
shared secret is used to prove that the newly deployed client is valid and 
connected to a valid server counterpart. Additionally, the shared secret is used to 
generate encrypted messaging channel. In a nutshell, the shared secret is the 
root where the higher layers of security are based on. 
 
The problem of the bootstrapping is, how the new client can have the secret 
already when it is generated and how the secret is stored securely. Traditionally, 
in the mobile phone systems like GSM or UMTS the mutual trust and 
confidentiality between the user equipment (UE) and home network (HN) has 
been built on a subscriber authentication key stored on a tamper resistant SIM-
card. [75] Naturally the key generation must happen in security-controlled factory 
environment. 
 
The SIM concept has similarities to hardware security keys: they also may have 
hardware backed shared secrets deployed already from the factory.  
 
 
7.2 The root of trust 
 
The root of trust problem domain is a major challenge for a mobile app 
authenticator. The low-level mechanisms that secure the subscriber in a mobile 
network are not generally available for the third-party mobile app makers. The 
root of trust must be based on something else. 
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In many mobile phone models, there exists a hardware backed isolated TEE 
(trusted execution environment). TEE is separated from the normal processing 
environment where the operating system and applications run [76]. As example 
of TEE, Apple has Secure Enclave [77] present in modern iPhones. 
Microprocessor vendor ARM has their TrustZone technology that can be utilized 
for the TEE implementations in mobile phone environments [78]. However, it is 
claimed that most of the smartphone and tablet contains a TEE today [76].  
 
TEE ensures that the code and data inside of it are protected with regarding 
confidentiality and integrity. Client applications of the TEE receive services like 
storage layer security, secure isolated cryptographic operations and secure 
timing services. 
 
It is important to note that the mobile app authenticator should generate the 
needed cryptographic keys inside a TEE. But possibilities to do so depend much 
on the APIs and the security mechanisms of the mobile operating systems as the 
developer of a third-party app does not have direct access to hardware. 
Fortunately, iOS of Apple and Android support the TEE through their key 
management systems. 
 
It is notable that generating and using cryptographic keys in a TEE helps to 
enhance the application security during runtime. It also enhances security of the 
communication protocol between client and server. But it does not prevent 
generation of fake clients: there is nothing that could allow the server to distinct 
a fraudulent client app from a valid one (assuming that the fake client can talk to 
the server with the protocol required). TEE is just a mechanism that may help 
preventing the identity thefts in some scenarios after the app is installed.  
 
 
 
8 Security of the mobile apps 
 
 
As mentioned before, the mobile app platforms and ecosystems evolve currently 
with high speed, and the security has problems to follow. Fortunately, the open 
source security community, academic research and the security business players 
on the market try to minimize the gap vigorously. One example of this threat 
mitigation activity is the OWASP Foundation that publishes the common threat 
check-lists to arise awareness among the app developers and businesses. 
 
OWASP Top 10 Mobile risks were 2016 [79]: 
 
M1: Improper Platform Usage 
M2: Insecure Data Storage 
M3: Insecure Communication 
M4: Insecure Authentication 
M5: Insufficient Cryptography 
M6: Insecure Authorization 
M7: Client Code Quality 
M8: Code Tampering 
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M9: Reverse Engineering 
M10: Extraneous Functionality  
 
In the following chapters, we discuss some of these aforementioned threats that 
the mobile applications are facing. 
 
 
8.1 App shielding  
 
Vulnerabilities in mobile environments may in some circumstances allow a 
hacker, foreign malicious app or malware to read the secrets of the mobile app 
authenticator from the runtime memory or from the persistent memory.  
 
Another common attack against mobile apps is repackaging. In repackaging the 
malware writer alters a legitimate application to include malicious code and then 
publishes it to an app market or even injects the additional functionalities on-the-
fly [80, 81]. So-called rooted or jailbroken operating systems are especially 
vulnerable for this approach.  
 
The rooting (Android) or jailbreaking (iOS) is a method to alter the operating 
system so that the various security related restrictions for the apps are removed. 
Typically, the apps are let to run on root (administrator) user privileges. This 
removes the boundaries of the app isolation of the operating system. Root user 
privileges permit reading any file in the persistent storage no matter which app 
owns it. The motivation for the rooting or jailbreaking may be that the end-user 
can, for example, load unsigned applications from illegal sources outside app 
stores. This has traditionally been popular in China.  
 
App shielding is generic term for mitigation methods against these 
aforementioned scenarios. App shielding typically includes methods like 
obfuscation of program code, white box cryptography and anti-tampering 
technologies. [82] 
 
 
8.2 White box cryptography 
 
When the white box cryptography is not applied, the cryptographic keys are 
located as sequential bytes in the memory space of an application during runtime. 
As stated before, the bytes can be read in some circumstances and this means 
theft of the confidential cryptographic secrets. 
 
Purpose of the white box cryptography is to prevent the exposure of the 
cryptographic secrets [13]. To reach this goal, the keys are obfuscated, stored in 
a distributed format in various memory locations (as non-sequential form) and the 
obsolete redundant data may be added into the keys. Additionally, the application 
code that executes the cryptographic algorithms is obfuscated and modified so 
that it is extremely difficult for human to read. For example, typical AES symmetric 
key encryption and decryption contains execution of loop over certain index. This 
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can be transformed to “flattened” lookup table based execution that is more 
difficult to reverse engineer. 
 
Implementations of white box cryptography can also protect the integrity of the 
executed binaries. The binaries can include multiple (even overlapping) hash 
functions that check during execution that the original code is not altered. 
Typically, when the integrity check shows positive finding about tampering, the 
application code may be forced to halt immediately to prevent the misuse. 
 
One interesting question is, whether the white box cryptography brings solution 
for the root of trust. White box cryptography allows application developers to inject 
keys and cryptographic algorithms into the application binaries with high 
confidence that the secrets are not detectable with reverse engineering methods. 
However, the key is not unique for each application and in no way tied to the 
device. It is questionable that the generic key alone could be a root of trust. 
 
 
8.3 Obfuscation 
 
The term obfuscation means manipulation of a program in such way that it keeps 
the original functional capabilities, but the manipulated program code becomes 
non-understandable by human.  
 
Boaz Barak et al. provided definition: “Informally, an obfuscator O is an (efficient, 
probabilistic) ‘compiler’ that takes as input a program (or circuit) P and produces 
a new program O(P) that has the same functionality as P yet is ‘unintelligible’ in 
some sense.” [83] 
 
Obfuscation can be seen as more important treatment for the Android apps than 
for iOS apps. The Android apps are typically made with Java –technology that is 
easily decompiled and reverse engineered with static analysis.  
 
 
8.4 Anti-tampering technologies 
 
The application can be tampered with various mechanisms by a hacker who 
wants to first reverse engineer the authenticator app and perhaps design an 
attack against it. At the end, the goal is to make fraudulent payments or to get 
access to some critical systems. The publisher of the authenticator app wants 
that the app is running in a safe environment enjoying the sandboxing of the 
operating system and all other security features designed by the phone 
manufacturer.  
 
 
8.4.1 Rooting and jailbreak detection 
 
As stated before, the rooting or jailbreaking makes the running environment 
fundamentally unsafe. The rooting or jailbreaking must be detected in order to 
estimate the trust that can be given for the authentication events.  
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Rooting and jailbreaking can be detected in some reliability level by using various 
checks made on the running environment. False positives are possible as the 
accuracy of the detection vary, and so multiple checks must be used 
simultaneously. Most of the detection methods rely on the basic idea that the app 
should not reach certain resources that are normally protected by the running 
environment. For example, app should not be able to add or modify files in 
protected areas. Also, successful attempt to read system files that require root 
privileges reveals that the operating system has probably been tampered. 
 
When the rooting or jailbreaking is detected during runtime the app may react to 
the situation by pre-defined way. Simplest method is to halt the app abruptly 
leaving no room to operate for the hacker. 
 
 
8.4.2 Guarding 
 
The app can be protected so that it calculates checksums over the application 
binaries during the running and so detects if some of the application fragments 
are changed. Typically, the calculations of the checksums have overlapping 
regions so that the application alteration without getting caught becomes very 
difficult. Desired reaction when the alteration of the binaries is detected may vary. 
The reaction can also be slightly delayed and so causing additional difficulty for 
the attacker to reverse engineer the logic. [84] 
 
 
8.4.3 Encryption wrappers 
 
In the white box cryptography, the basic idea is to prevent the secret information 
to be readable in clear text. Similarly, in using the encryption wrappers the 
principle is to prevent the software binaries to exist in cleartext format allowing 
unauthorized static analysis. With encryption wrapper, the software is normally 
encrypted and only decrypted dynamically at runtime. [84] 
 
 
8.5 The reality about security of the mobile apps 
 
The security level of the financial mobile apps has been under interest of the 
security consultant companies for many years (since invention of the mobile 
banking apps). The point of view is of course commercial and the motivation for 
the information gathering is to sell consultancy. But despite the background and 
biased opinions, the findings of the surveys are noteworthy. They conclude that 
banking apps are generally speaking insecure. 
 
Accenture and NowSecure Lab explored 30 banking apps from North America in 
2016 [85]. They downloaded the apps straight from the app stores and performed 
780 tests for the apps. Both major mobile platforms were included (iOS & 
Android). Some of the findings are collected below. 
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• 60% of the apps were not obfuscated in Android.  
• 13% of the apps did not use certificate validation in networking protocols. 
• 33% of the apps used world-writable files 
 
 
Another example of commercial research is the study made by joint effort of 
crypto & security consultancy vendors Inside Secure and UL [86]. They selected 
19 apps made for consumer use. Apps were from various geographical markets. 
The study did not target to any specific size of banks and there were well 
established companies and new small challenger banks among the publishers of 
the apps. 
 
The key finding from this study was that only 5% of the apps reached the security 
level that was used as benchmark, namely Visa & Mastercard security standards 
for mobile payment applications. Majority of the apps had very low security levels. 
 
The requirements for the benchmark level were (in a nutshell)  [86]: 
 
• Code handling sensitive data and algorithms is developed in a language 
that compiles to processor native machine code (i.e. C/C++) 
• Strong obfuscation of all critical code 
• Anti-tamper protection of the application 
• Cryptography protected by whitebox (or equivalent technology) 
• No sensitive text visible in static analysis of code 
• Network traffic encrypted using TLS 1.2 and downgrade not possible 
• Certificate pinning applied to networking 
• Strong device binding 
 
An interesting research topic could be to study which were the reasons that led 
to the design decisions regarding the application security. The four-factor model 
could probably be used for this research. Unfortunately, we must leave this topic 
out from the scope of this thesis. 
 
 
8.6 Summary about protecting technologies 
 
The highest protection levels are achieved when multiple protecting technologies 
are used together and in synergy. It is possible to achieve a level where it is fairly 
unpractical and unbeneficial to try to arrange an attack against the app.  
 
Unfortunately, the app shielding methods typically increase the size of the 
binaries and slow down the application execution as the control flow is altered. 
Also, the steps required to generate obfuscated and shielded binaries require 
extra effort from the developers. Debugging the errors in production 
environments may be extremely complex with shielded apps. These may slow 
down the motivation to adopt the shielding technologies for authenticator apps. 
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9 End-to-end security of the system 
 
When the authentication system is based on the client-server model, there must 
be layers of trust all the way from the client device hardware layer to the 
application server backend and to the app publishing system of the mobile 
platform. This approach is described in the corporate security as an onion model 
[81]. Basic idea of the model is that the security of the system is based on logical 
layers. However, the onion model security can be challenged also. The system 
architecture does not always follow layered design and can include also single 
point of failures.  
 
 
9.1 The viewpoint of an attacker 
One possible way to examine the security of an authentication platform is to look 
from the viewpoint of the attacker. And the onion model may help to visualize this 
viewpoint. Attacks against mobile authenticator app ecosystem may be classified 
to several main categories:  
 
• Attack against the user of the mobile authenticator app 
 
• Attack against the execution environment of the mobile app 
 
• Attack against the communication channel that the app is using when it is 
connecting to other clients or servers. 
 
• Attack against the application server  
 
• Attack against the mobile app development 
 
• Attack against the publishing framework 
 
All attacks must be taken into consideration when designing an authentication 
system architecture. The onion model can be challenged regarding the possibility 
of multiple simultaneous attacks. The model is based on assumption that the 
attacks are sequential. 
 
 
9.2 The PIN lifecycle model 
 
One commonly used concept for knowledge-based authentication factor is 
personal identification number (PIN). This number is traditionally used with 
smartcard-based credit cards but also for unlocking the SIM card (subscriber 
identification module) of a mobile phone. During last decade, the PIN concept is 
also adopted to mobile apps. App may require an authentication step before it is 
permitted to start, or app may require a step-up authentication [87] when user is 
doing a critical transaction that only he/she is entitled to.  
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Because of long history of PIN, lots of research and standards are related to 
banking sector. Same basic usage principles and dynamics can be applied to the 
mobile app authenticators as to the smart cards. 
 
One noticeable standard for the PIN security is the VISA PIN security guideline 
[10]. It presents a reference model for the security considerations based on a PIN 
lifecycle. Many of these aspects are valuable for the mobile authenticator app 
context, too. 
 
 
Process  Process Description  
PIN Creation  
Generation of the PIN, card magnetic stripe 
personalization, ICC personalization (if applicable), load 
to issuer authorization systems.  
PIN selection  Cardholder self-selection of PIN.  
PIN Transmission  
Any transmission of PINs: 
• between issuer approved PIN handling devices,  
• to and from card holders.  
PIN Storage  
Protection of PIN-related data by issuers, issuer 
approved PIN handling devices and cardholders  
PIN Processing  
All processing of PINs within a PIN-handling device.  
Online PIN 
verification  
Online verification of the 
cardholder PIN.  
PIN handling device 
management  
Deployment, usage and decommissioning of equipment 
used to process and store PINs.  
PIN related Key 
Management  
Management of cryptographic keys for secure PIN 
creation, storage, processing, transmission and 
verification  
Cardholder 
authentication  
Process by which the cardholder supplies credentials to 
a system to access PIN management functionality  
PIN advice  Notification of the PIN to the cardholder.  
PIN change  Cardholder or issuer re-selection of PIN.  
Additional PIN 
management 
functions  
Any other functionality required by issuers to manage 
their PINs  
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Note: reprinted from VISA Issuer PIN Security Guideline, 2010 
 
 
9.2.1 PIN creation 
 
The authenticator issuer may preset the PIN (like some banks do for the chip-
based credit cards) or it can be decided and initialized by the end-user during the 
device enrollment process. The former approach is usually considered to be 
safer. 
 
Research on PIN security has indicated that PINs selected by end user are 
weaker because humans tend to select common easily remembered number 
sequences or something that is semi-public information like their birthday. PIN 
length is also limited. Common practice is to allow down to 4 digits for the PIN 
length. Short PINs require only low cognitive effort from the end-user, but they 
are vulnerable to brute force attacks either by human or automated attacker. 
 
Joseph Bonneau et al from University of Cambridge found out that guessing the 
PIN based on victim’s birth date led to success once for 11 cases. If usage of the 
obvious number sequences like 1234 was prohibited, they gained access by 
guessing once for 18 cases [88].  
 
 
 
9.2.2 PIN storage 
 
In addition to the PIN guessing easiness issue described above, the PIN can also 
be stolen by a hacker or malware installed in the running environment of an 
authenticator app. 
 
Mobile platform vendors fortunately have addressed the challenge to store secret 
items by supplying secure key-value storages like iOS Keychain and Android 
Keystore. These mechanisms provide basic safety against malicious apps that 
aim to steal the data from other app’s static storage. Also, if the secure storages 
supplied by the mobile platforms work in co-operation with TEE environment, 
higher security levels are achieved. 
 
 
 
9.2.3 PIN processing 
 
The risk scenarios related to the PIN processing in the mobile device can be 
categorized to following categories: theft from memory and theft from glass  
 
 
Theft from memory 
 
Numerous times there have been vulnerabilities in mobile platforms (specially in 
Android operating system) that have allowed a mobile app to read foreign app’s 
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address space. These vulnerabilities could be used to read the PIN from memory 
when it is typed by the end-user. The PIN alone is not of course useful information 
for an attacker, but when combining with other vulnerabilities it may lead to 
situation where foreign app or attacker is able to reach valuable information or 
activate remotely events in an app.   
 
If the application platform supplies a protected end-to-end connectivity from 
touchpad screen to trusted execution environment, the attacker is probably not 
able to reach the protected data (PIN in this case) though runtime memory. 
 
Theft from glass 
 
In this scenario the attacker is able to intercept the character reading process 
either by getting information about the touch event coordinates or even more 
straightforward approach by setting an own keyboard overlay on the screen 
capturing the user’s touching actions. Again, the PIN alone is only one component 
of the malicious orchestration targeting to a fraudulent transaction or something 
valuable. 
 
PIN on glass: PIN entry on a touchscreen keypad integrated on a PCI-
approved terminal. 
PIN on COTS: PIN entry on the touchscreen of an off-the-shelf consumer 
smartphone or tablet connected to a PCI-certified card reader. 
PIN on terminal: PIN entry on a physical, push-button keypad on a card 
terminal. 
Reprinted from website: https://www.mobiletransaction.org/what-is-pin-on-glass/ 
 
The banking industry has been actively driving security in this context by 
publishing related standards. Payment Card Industry (PCI) has released security 
requirements standard for Software-based PIN Entry on COTS (commercial of 
the shelf) devices [89].  
 
 
 
10  Visions about the future 
 
 
The previous chapters of this thesis have presented some aspects of current and 
historical authentication mechanisms. In this chapter, we present concepts and 
trends that can have an effect to the next generation authentication solutions. 
 
 
10.1  Computational offloading 
 
The concept of computational offloading may become popular in the future 
among the authentication platforms. For example, Dejan Kovachev et.al stated in 
their survey [90] that the mobile applications will be developed in the future so 
that the heavy processing will be executed in the cloud. 
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Computational offloading may allow the authentication platforms to have features 
that are beyond computational capabilities of the current mobile devices. The 
concept of computational offloading means an arrangement where a 
computationally intensive task is moved from one execution environment to 
another one that is more suitable for the task. Typically, it may be better to 
process large amounts of data in a server environment than in a mobile device 
having limited CPU capacity and limited battery life. 
 
Recently there has been rising interest to mobile edge computing paradigm 
(MEC). The rationale behind the MEC is to improve computational capabilities of 
a system by performing the intensive activities in the edge nodes on the mobile 
network. This brings benefits regarding latency, for example (when compared to 
traditional cloud computing). 
 
Artificial intelligence and machine learning are examples of features that benefit 
from computational offloading and MEC. Machine learning algorithms may be 
useful for making decisions about authentication requests based on complex 
input data. How to provide authentication decisions based on multiple variables 
is not a new computational task. For example, the 3-D Secure [91] compliant 
access control server of a credit card issuer must take multiple conditions and 
variables into account when estimating the trust of a payment transaction.  
 
 
10.2  Autonomous authentication 
 
One challenge for the authentication has traditionally been the usability. Users 
have thought that authentication methods are clumsy and create too much 
cognitive load. Users probably would prefer that the system requiring 
authentication would authenticate them autonomously. In the best case, 
authentication would be performed without any effort from the user. 
 
Modern biometric authentication methods have come very close to achieve the 
minimal effort from the user. Face recognition and fingerprint authentication on 
mobile phones require no or little cognitive effort to use. However, they fail 
occasionally in certain circumstances. For example, when the fingers are wet the 
fingerprint reader may fail to recognize the fingerprint.  
 
One common solution for the effortless user authentication experience could be 
the autonomous authentication. The basic idea of the autonomous authentication 
is to make continuous observations about the end-user by the device that he/she 
is using. The observations, i.e. practically collected data, are analyzed with 
advanced statistical methods to gather a holistic trust score. The data that is 
collected for the analysis can be taken from various sources. 
 
 
10.2.1  Mobile carrier data 
 
The mobile operators have access to the data that the mobile phones receive or 
transmit when they are connected to the network. The online behavior of the end-
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user can be analyzed, for example, by recording the DNS-queries sent from the 
device [92]. Also, the IP addresses that the device is connected to can be tracked.  
 
The mobile carrier data can be utilized as one data source among others for the 
statistical analysis of the autonomous authentication. For example, if the device 
suddenly starts to send packets to IP addresses that are either known to be rogue 
addresses or are not recorded in the usage history of the end-user, the trust score 
can be reduced. 
 
10.2.2  Behavioral biometric data 
 
The uniqueness of the human physical actions has been researched for many 
decades. For example, the human keystroke patterns have been found to be 
useful for authenticating individual users using computer systems [93] [94]. In 
mobile phone environment, there is typically no physical keyboard, so something 
else must be looked to find patterns from the actions of the end-user.  
 
It has been found that the user actions performed on the touch screens of the 
mobile phones vary and can be used for the analysis and authentication [95] [96]. 
Timing of the finger actions, finger pressure and the area under the finger 
pressure are typically examined. 
 
 
10.2.3 Device sensor data 
 
The smartphones are equipped today with various sensors like accelerometer, 
temperature sensor and inclination sensor. Furthermore, the smartphones have 
typically positioning capability based on GPS. Readings of these sensors can be 
used for input for the statistical analysis in order to find patterns from the behavior 
of the end user [92]. Anomalies in the sensor readings can be used to weaken 
the trust score. 
 
 
10.2.4 Summary 
 
The continuous collection of the data from the various sources and the continuous 
statistical analysis may provide way to autonomous authentication. This should 
be researched more in the future. Autonomous authentication may be the next 
successful authentication method. However, the concerns of the privacy may set 
a challenge for this development. 
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